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DOES THE ILLINOIS CANNABIS CONTROL ACT
VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY ENUNCIATED
IN THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION?
INTRODUCTION
Narcotics control is an area of the law which has shown great
change in recent years, particularly with regard to the use of

marijuana and its prohibition by the state. In Illinois, narcotics
law has been a dynamic area with two major statutory enactments,1 one leading case, 2 and a host of case law development.
Of primary importance here is the current status of the Illinois law concerning cannabis control. An examination reveals
that the law in the area of cannabis control is unsettled in Illinois and elsewhere. 3 Assertions have frequently been raised that
violations of personal constitutional rights occur whenever the
state attempts to prohibit marijuana use. A once rigid unanimity
of judicial opinion in rejecting such assertions has wavered of
late. Where it once seemed that there could be no serious doubt
that the state has the unqualified right to prohibit marijuana
use by the individual, 4 recent developments in the law suggest
that the state's purported right is open to question. Indeed, the
time may be at hand when the Illinois Supreme Court deems
that the State no longer has an unqualified right to prohibit the
use of marijuana.
CANNABIS PROHIBITION IN ILLINOIS:
THE CANNABIS CONTROL ACT

In 1971 the Illinois Legislature significantly revised all the
narcotics law in Illinois by enacting the Illinois Controlled Substances Act" and the Cannabis Control Act. 6 The Controlled
Substances Act was thought to be a comprehensive act dealing
with all aspects of the matter of abuse of controlled substances.
As the Governor's Approval Message indicates, 7 it is noteworthy
1. Act of Aug. 16, 1971,

ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 56

, §§ 701-18 (Supp.

1975); Act of Aug. 16, 1971, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 561/2, §§ 1100-1603 (Supp.

1975).
2. People v. McCabe, 49 Ill. 2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971).
3. The Oregon Legislature has recently passed a bill decriminalizing

possession of marijuana in certain contexts. ORE. REV. STAT. 167.207
(1974). The Illinois Legislature has failed to enact a similar bill.
4. See United States ex rel. Fink v. Heyd, 287 F. Supp. 716 (E.D.
La. 1968), aff'd, 408 F.2d 7, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 895; State v. Tabory,
260 S.C. 335, 196 S.E.2d 111 (1973); People v. Mistriel, 110 Cal. 2d 110,
241 P.2d 1050 (1952). Cf. Mugler v. United States, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
5.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 561/2, §§ 1100-1603 (Supp. 1975).

6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 561/2, §§ 701-18 (Sunp. 1975).

7. Ill. H. Jour., 77th Gen. Assembly, 1971 Sess., Vol. III at 5464.
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that marijuana does not come within the purview of the Controlled Substances Act. The legislature recognized that in dealing with the control of marijuana, it was dealing with a situation
distinct from the larger issue of controlled substances.
In enacting the Cannabis Control Act, the Illinois Legislature
realized that the then current state of scientific and medical
knowledge made it necessary to acknowledge the physical, psychological, and sociological damage which accompanies the use
of marijuana, but that it is used in Illinois despite this damage.8
As previous legislation was deemed unrealistic and ineffective, 9
the General Assembly expressly declared that its intent in passing the Cannabis Control Act was to establish a reasonable
penalty structure responsive to the current state of knowledge. 10
Sentences were to be progressively increased for correspondingly
greater amounts of cannabis involved and the courts vested with
a wide latitude of sentencing discretion. 1
Consequently, the
Cannabis Control Act establishes graduated penalties with the
severity of sentence being dependent upon both the amount of
"substance containing cannabis" and the type of illegal activity
involved, i.e., possession, delivery, or manufacture. 1 2 In addition,
first offenders may be placed on probation at the court's discretion. 13 Such is the rationale and structure of current cannabis
control law in the State of Illinois.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CANNABIS CONTROL

The Right of the State
When a state regulates private activity in furtherance of the
public welfare, it is exercising inherent police powers. 1 4 In
utilizing such police powers to proscribe undesirable conduct, the
government must demonstrate the existence of a legitimate state
interest.' 5 When an exercise of police power infringes on the
rights of the individual, it is the assertion of legitimate state interest which is resorted to as justification for such state action.'8
8. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 56 , § 701 (Supp. 1975). But see text accompanying notes 89, 90, 91 infra.
9. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 562, § 701 (Supp. 1975).
10. Id.; see Ill. H. Jour., 77th Gen. Assembly, 1971 Sess., Vol. III at
5464.
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 , § 701 (Supp. 1975).
12. Id. §§ 704-09.
13. Id. § 710.
14. 72 C.J.S. 207 (1951).
15. See Bonnie and Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree
of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition,56 VA. L. REv. 971, 990 (1970). The discussion here
pertains to the constitutional underpinnings of the state's right to exercise its police power towards the end of the prohibition of alcohol.
16. See Borras v. State, 229 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied,
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How courts perceive this inherent state right, and the corresponding requisite interest necessary to warrant its valid exercise, is frequently determinative when an individual asserts the
invalidity or unconstitutionality of a purported exercise by the
state of that police power. Those courts which take an expansive view of the inherent police power of the state, and of the
virtually unbridled judgment of the legislature, seem to feel that
the determination of a legitimate state interest is the domain of
the legislature. 1T Once the legislature has enacted criminal legislation declaring the state's interest, the existence of such a law
per se constitutes a compelling state interest. The legislature's
discretion is then not subject to judicial scrutiny, unless it should
prove to be wholly devoid of reason. 8
Not all courts view the existence of a criminal statute as
constituting per se a compelling state interest, but they do show
deference to the legislature's judgment. The statute will be accorded a presumption of validity and the party asserting its invalidity will be saddled with the burden of proving the absence
of a legitimate state interest.' 9
Thus, when a state has exercised its police power, and an
individual claims that his rights have been violated, the issue
will turn on the legitimacy of the state interest vis-a-vis the individual's right which is purportedly violated. Two cases are
exemplary of this balancing process.
In People v. Woody 20 the Supreme Court of California was
faced with a situation wherein the defendants, who were Navajo
Indians, had been convicted of illegal possession of peyote. The
defendants claimed that the statute under which they were convicted imposed an unreasonable burden on the free exercise of
their religion because they used peyote as a sacramental symbol
similar to the bread and wine used in Christian churches. The
court in reversing the conviction declared that "the state may
abridge religious practices only upon a demonstration that some
400 U.S. 808; Broom v. State, 463 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933; cf. Miller v. State, 458 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1970).

17. See note 4 supra.

18. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 861 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd
395 U.S. 6 (1969). See also State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 602, 148 S.E.2d
565, 568 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 917 (1967). Courts that take this

position often look for support to Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878), wherein the Supreme Court ruled that Congress could constitutionally apply to Mormons a prohibition against polygamy on the basis
of a compelling and unavoidable state interest. As will be seen later,
the "compelling and unavoidable state interest" language has acquired
special significance.
19. See Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 243 N.E.2d 898 (1969);
People v. Irvin, 264 Cal. App. 2d 747, 70 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1968) ; cf. Clark
v. Craven, 437 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1971).
20. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
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compelling state interest outweighs the defendant's interests in
'21
religious freedom.
In balancing the conflicting interests, the court weighed the
freedom of religion as protected by the United States Constitution against the State's asserted compelling interest. Since the
use of peyote incorporated the essence of defendants' religious
expression, the court felt that the freedom of religion scale was
heavy. Yet the use of peyote presented only slight danger to
the State and to the enforcement of its laws; as such, the second
scale was deemed relatively light. The court concluded that the
scales tipped in favor of constitutional protection. 22
In contradistinction to Woody stands another California case,
that of People v. Collins. 23 Here, the defendant, who had been

convicted of possession of marijuana, did not worship or sanctify
marijuana. Rather, the defendant testified that he used it as
an auxiliary to engage in meditative communication with the Supreme Being. 24

The defendant asserted freedom of religion as

a defense. The court replied that "the state has a limited authority to prohibit religiously motivated conduct which collides
with a compelling state interest. '25 After examining the validity
of the defendant's claims, the court concluded that the laws of
California prohibiting marijuana possession expressed a compelling state interest and did not violate the defendant's constitutional right to freedom of religion. 26 As such, the scales here
failed to tip in favor of the defendant.
Therefore, it appears that to warrant an exercise of the inherent police powers of the state, when such exercise is in conflict with an individual's constitutionally protected rights, the
state must demonstrate a "legitimate and compelling" interest
in the proposed action. Absent such an interest, the state's exercise of such police powers is unconstitutional.
The State Must Show a Compelling Interest Only
if PersonalLibertiesAre Threatened
As noted earlier, when a state seeks to exercise its inherent police power, and such exercise conflicts with a constitutional
right, the state will be required to demonstrate more than that
a regulatory statute bears some rational relationship to the effec21. Id. at 718, 394 P.2d at 815, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 71 (emphasis added).
Thus, when an exercise of the police power is in conflict with a constitutional right, it will apparently necessitate not just a legitimate, but a
compelling state interest to sustain the exercise. See note 18 supra.
22. Id. at 727, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
23. 273 Cal. App. 2d 486, 78 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1969).
24. Id. at 487, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
25. Id. at 488, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
26. Id.
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tuation of a proper state purpose.2 7 "Where there is a significant
encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only
' 28
upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling.
The law must be shown to be "necessary, and not merely rationally related to the accomplishment of a permissible state
'29
policy.
If a state enactment does not infringe upon personal liberties
or constitutional rights, it will then be subjected to a less stringent judicial test, the test being only that there be a rational
basis of fact that reasonably supports the enactment. 30 This in
large part explains why in many cases assertions that set forth
the purported unconstitutionality of state legislation have been
rejected.
Courts have been uniform in failing to find a personal liberty
or constitutional right to smoke marijuana. Absent such a
liberty or right, the state prohibition need only meet the "rationality test" to be sustained. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Leis3 1
the defendants insisted that the right to smoke marijuana is
guaranteed by the Constitutions of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and of the United States and must, therefore, be bal32
anced against the interests of the State in prohibiting its use.
The response by the court was rather incisive: "No such right
exists. '33 The court stated that such right was neither preserved
by either Constitution, nor included within a zone of privacy
formed by the penumbras of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and
34
ninth amendments of the Constitution of the United States.
As if its position could have been seen as equivocal, the court
reiterated that "[t]he defendants have no right, fundamental or
otherwise, to become intoxicated by means of the smoking of
marijuana."3 5
Having effectively dismissed the defendants' claims of the
presence of a constitutional right, it became a simple matter for
the court to proceed to uphold the Massachusetts' statute under
the "rationality test." Commonwealth v. Leis poses a rather
27. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965)

(J. Goldberg

concurring). Note that Justice Goldberg uses the terms "personal liberty" and "Constitutional right" almost interchangeably.

28. Id.

(J.Goldberg quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S.

516,524 (1960)).
29. Id. (J.Goldberg quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,

196 (1964)).
30. See Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 192, 243 N.E.2d 898,

901 (1969); cf. People v. McCabe, 49 Ill. 2d 338, 340-41, 275 N.E.2d 407,
408 (1969).
31. 355 Mass. 189, 243 N.E.2d 898 (1969).
32. Id. at 195, 243 N.E.2d at 903.
33. Id.

34. Id. at 195, 243 N.E.2d at 903-04.
35. Id.
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common example of the reasoning involved in this area. Also
exemplary is People v. Aguiar.36 In this case the California court
correctly pointed out that "[t] he enactment of laws for the protection of society is for the legislature and not for the courts
unless a constitutional right is clearly violated . . . ,,17 The
court then went on to point out that "there is no constitutionally
protected right to indulge in the use of euphoric drugs. '38 The
defendant's constitutional contentions were refuted.
State v. Kantner39 provides another example of this type of
reasoning. The defendants asserted, inter alia, that the use of
marijuana involved an issue of "fundamental liberty," and that
a different standard of review should have been applied to the
statute in question. The Supreme Court of Hawaii did not feel
that the defendants had established that the interest of the individual in possessing and using marijuana was within the class
of interests to which the state and federal constitutions accord
the highest degree of protection. 40 The court referred to Griswold v. Connecticut41 and People v. Aguiar42 and concluded that
there was no fundamental guarantee protecting the use and possession of euphoric drugs. 43 Again, the statutes in question were
upheld as constitutional.
It would appear that no claim of constitutional right or personal liberty relating to the use of marijuana would be adopted
by any court. Thus, no state would have to bear the burden
of showing a compelling state interest in the absolute prohibition
of marijuana use. But in State v. Ravin 4" the Supreme Court
of Alaska was persuaded that the right to privacy encompasses
the right to consume marijuana in the privacy of one's home.
State v. Ravin: The Right to Privacy Encompasses
the Right to Consume Marijuanain the Privacy
of One's Home
In State v. Ravin4 5 the constitutionality of Alaska's statute
prohibiting possession of marijuana 46 was put in issue. The
36. 257 Cal. App. 2d 597, 65 Cal. Rptr. 171, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 970

(1968).

37. Id. at 601, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 173 (quoting People v. George, 42 Cal.
App. 2d 568, 573, 109 P.2d 404, 407 (1941)).
38. Id. at 603, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 175. The court went on to discount
the applicability of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
39. 53 Hawaii 327, 493 P.2d 306 (1972).
40. Id. at 332, 493 P.2d at 310.
41. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
42. Supra note 36.
43. 53 Hawaii at 332, 493 P.2d at 310. See also Miller v. State, 458
S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
44. No. 1156 (Alas., May 27, 1975).
45. Id.

46.

ALAs. STAT.

17.12.010 (Supp. 1974).
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thrust of the defendant's argument was that there exists under
the United States and Alaska Constitutions a fundamental right
to privacy, the scope of which is sufficiently broad to encompass
and protect the possession of marijuana for personal use. Given
such a fundamental constitutional right, it was argued by the
defendant that the State would then have the burden of demonstrating a compelling state interest in prohibiting the possession
of marijuana. The defendant further urged that the evidence
submitted at trial by both sides demonstrated that marijuana is
a relatively innocuous substance, at least as compared with other
less restricted substances, and that nothing even47 approaching a
compelling state interest was proven by the State.
The court proceeded to discuss the test to be applied when
a claim is made that state action encroaches upon an individual's
constitutional rights:
Once a fundamental right under the Constitution of Alaska has
been shown to be involved and it has been further shown that
this constitutionally protected right has been impaired by governmental action, then the government must come forward and
meet its substantial burden of establishing that the abridgement
was justified by a compelling governmental interin question
est.48
The court also pointed out that this standard is familiar to
49
After then
federal law as well, citing Bates v. Little Rock.
be applied
to
test"
"rationality
stringent
less
distinguishing the
freedom
an
individual
with
interferes
action
when governmental
50
court
the
as
fundamental,
characterized
in an area which is not
right-compelling
voiced dissatisfaction with the fundamental
state interest test. 51 The court elected to utilize a test whereby
it would first determine whether there exists a proper governmental interest in the imposition of restrictions on marijuana use,
and if so, whether the means chosen bear a substantial relationship to the legislative purpose. Thus, if governmental restrictions interfere with an individual's right to privacy, the court
would require that the relationship between the means and the
52
ends be not only reasonable, but also close and substantial.
The court, in applying the standard it had elucidated, set out
on a two step undertaking: to determine if any of Ravin's rights
to deterhad been abridged by the statute in question, and if so,
5 3
justified.
was
impingement
statutory
the
whether
mine
The court first turned to federal law to determine if a federal
47. No. 1156 (Alas., May 27, 1975) at 3.

48. Id. at 4 (quoting Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 171 (Alas. 1972)).

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
No. 1156 (Alas., May 27, 1975) at 5.
Id.
Id. at 6, 7.
Id. at 7.
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constitutional right of privacy might be applicable. The court
surveyed several United States Supreme Court decisions5 4 and
found from its survey that
the federal right of privacy arises only in connection with other

fundamental rights, such as the grouping of rights which involve
the home. And even in connection with the penumbra of
home-related rights, the right to privacy in the sense of immunity from prosecution is absolute only when the55 private activity will not endanger or harm the general public.
The court then turned to the concept of privacy under the
Alaska Constitution.5 6 The court noted that the right of privacy
is specifically enumerated in Alaska's Constitution, yet such a
right of privacy is not absolute, but must be limited by the legitimate needs of the State to protect the health and welfare of its
citizens.5 7 After reflecting upon the leading Alaska case 58 and
referring to other jurisdictions, 59 the court announced that were
it to continue to utilize the fundamental right-compelling state
interest test, it would conclude that there is not a fundamental
right to possess or ingest marijuana in Alaska, as the right to
privacy amendment of the Alaska Constitution cannot be read
so as to make the possession or ingestion of marijuana itself a
fundamental right. 60 Further, since a discrete federal right of
privacy, separate from the penumbras of specifically enumerated
constitutional rights, has not, in 4.v view of the Supreme Court
of Alaska, been articulated by the United States Supreme Court," 1
the court stated that were it employing its former test, it would
likewise find there is no fundamental right under the United
States Constitution to ingest marijuana. 2 But, the court went
on:
Ravin's right to privacy contentions are not susceptible to disposition solely in terms of answering the question whether there
is a general fundamental constitutional right to possess or smoke
54. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973);
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
55. No. 1156 (Alas., May 27, 1975) at 10.
56. ALAS. CONST. art. I, § 22. The section reads:
The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be in-

fringed. The legislature shall implement this section.
57. No. 1156 (Alas., May 27, 1975) at 13.
58. Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alas. 1972).
59. State v. Kanter, 53 Hawaii 327, 493 P.2d 306, cert. denied, 409 U.S.

948 (1972); People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d 878 (1972).

The

court looked with favor towards the dissenting opinion of Justice T.G.
Kavanagh in the Sinclair case. J. Kavanagh stated at 387 Mich. at 133,
194 N.W.2d at 896:
I find that our statute violates the Federal and State Constitutions
in that it is an impermissible intrusion on the fundamental rights to
liberty and the pursuit of happiness and is an unwarranted interference with the right to possess and use private property.
60. No. 1156 (Alas., May 27, 1975) at 16.
61. Id. at 17.

62. Id.
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marijuana. This leads us to a more detailed examination of the
right to privacy and the relevancy of where the right is exercised. At one end of the scale of the scope of the right to privacy is possession or ingestion in the individual's home. If there
is any area of human activity to which a right of privacy pertains more than any other, it is in the home. 68

The court returned to an examination of federal law 4 and
Alaska law and concluded that "privacy in the home is a fundamental right, under both the federal and Alaska Constitutions." 65 Having found such a right, the court went on to delcare
that
[t]his right to privacy would encompass the possession and
ingestion of substances such as marijuana in a personal, non-

commercial context in the home unless the state can meet its
burden and show that proscription of possession of marijuana in
the home is supportable by achievement of a legitimate state
interest. 66

The court turned to the question of whether the State had
demonstrated a sufficient justification for the general prohibition
of possession of marijuana in the interest of the public welfare,
and whether the State had met its greater burden of showing
a close and substantial relationship between public welfare and
control of ingestion or possession or marijuana in the home for
personal use.6 7 The court reviewed the record, examined several
additional works,68 and stated: "It appears that the use of marijuana, as it is presently used in the United States today, does
not constitute a public health problem of any significant dimensions." 69
The state offered several justifications for upholding the
statute in question, including the assertions that marijuana is a
psychoactive drug, that it is not a harmless substance, that heavy
use has concomitant risk, that it is capable of precipitating a psychotic reaction at least in individuals predisposed towards such
a reaction, and that its use adversely affects the user's ability
to operate an automobile. 70 The only significant risk in the use
of marijuana, which the court found to be established to a reasonable degree of certainty, was the effect of marijuana intoxica63. Id. at 17, 18 (emphasis added).

64. U.S. CONST. amend. I, III, IV, V. See note 54 supra.

65. No. 1156 (Alas., May 27, 1975) at 20.

66. Id. at 21. The word "this" would appear to refer back to the
preceding sentence in which the court spoke of a right to privacy under
Alaska's Constitution. But having found a comparable federal right, it

would seem that the court was speaking with reference to such federal
right as well. Of course, the Alaska court's pronouncements as to the
federal right are but persuasive authority.
67. No. 1156 (Alas., May 27, 1975) at 22.
68. Id. n. 43.
69. Id. at 27.
70. Id. at 32.
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tion on driving. 71 The court discounted the assumption that the
State has the authority to protect the individual from his own
folly-that is, the State can control activities which present no
harm to anyone except those using them. 72 Instead, the court
adopted the general proposition that:
[T]he authority of the state to exert control over the individual
extends to activities of the individual which affect others or
the public at large as it relates to matters73of public health or
safety, or to provide for the general welfare.
The court concluded by deciding that, given the effect of
marijuana on driving, the individual's right to possess or ingest
marijuana while driving would be subject to prohibition. However, given the relative insignificance of marijuana consumption
as a health problem in today's society, the potential harm generated by drivers under the influence of marijuana, standing
alone, does not create a close and substantial relationship between the public welfare and the control of the ingestion or possession of marijuana in the home for personal use. "Thus, there
is no adequate justification for the State's intrusion into the citizen's right to privacy by its prohibition of possession of mari'' 74
juana by an adult for personal consumption in the home.
A Right to Privacy Specifically Enumerated in
the Illinois Constitution
The Supreme Court of Alaska, in Ravin, apparently based
its decision on both a federal and state right to privacy. The
Alaska court's interpretation of the federal right to privacy
would not, of course, be mandatory authority outside of Alaska.
Rather, such a pronouncement would only be persuasive authority. The Illinois Supreme Court has made no such pronouncements regarding its interpretation of the federally created right to
privacy. But in construing the fourth amendment of the United
States Constitution, 75 the search and seizure provision, the
Illinois Supreme Court has indicated its belief that the purpose
of the fourth amendment is to protect individuals from unwarranted intrusions into their privacy and to guard the privacy of the person in his home. 76 Having voiced to this extent
its concern for the privacy of the individual in the home, it would
seem to require little stretching for the Illinois Supreme Court
71. Id. at 33.
72. Id.

73. Id. at 35. But see Borras v. State, 229 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 1969),

cert. denied, 400 U.S. 808.
74. No. 1156 (Alas., May 27, 1975) at 39, 40 (emphasis added).
75. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
76. People v. Abrams, 48 Ill. 2d 446, 271 N.E.2d 37 (1971); People
v. Bussie, 41 111. 2d 323, 243 N.E.2d 196 (1968).
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to embrace the concept of a federal right to privacy, based on
Griswold and its progeny as elucidated in Ravin.
The significance of the Ravin decision in Illinois is not
limited to the possible impact of the court's conceptualization of
the federal right to privacy. The Ravin decision also turned on
the fact that the right to privacy is specifically enumerated in
Alaska's Constitution. 7" There is likewise a specific right to privacy enunciated in the Illinois Constitution.78 While the provision is placed in the context of the search and seizure provisions, it quite clearly states the right of people to be secure
in their homes against unreasonable invasions of privacy. 79 The
Committee Report of the Constitutional Bill of Rights Committee
should prove illustrative of what type of privacy the Committee
intended:
[T]he Committee concluded that it was essential to the dignity
and well being of the individual that every person be guaranteed
by a zone of privacy in which his thoughts and highly personal
behavior were not subject to disclosure or review. The new provision creates a direct right to freedom from such invasions by
government or public officials.80
Given this constitutionally enumerated right of privacy, particularly in the home, it would appear that the State may well

impinge such right by the Cannabis Control Act, which makes
it illegal for the individual to possess marijuana in the privacy
of his home. If this is so, the question next arises whether there
is a compelling state interest to justify such intrusion.
People v. McCabe: What Does the Illinois Supreme
Court Think of Marijuana?

In People v. McCabe8l the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the inclusion of marijuana in the Narcotic Drug Act,82 rather
77. See note 56 supra.
78. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 (1970). The section provides:
The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures,
invasions of privacy, or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means. No warrant shall issue without
probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
79. Id.
80. ILL. ANN. CoNST. art. I, § 6,commentary at 317-18 (Smith-Hurd
1971) (emphasis added). Note the similarity in language ("zone of privacy") between this provision of the Illinois Constitution and the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Griswold. That this zone of privacy is not limited to the home has been recognized in several Illinois
cases: Illinois State Employees Assoc. v. Walker, 57 Ill. 2d 512, 315
N.E.2d 9, cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 642 (1974); People v. Reddock, 13 Ill.
App. 3d 296, 300 N.E.2d 31 (1973); Stein v. Howlett, 52 Ill. 2d 570, 289
N.E.2d 409 (1972); People v. Harden, 6 Ill App. 3d 172 284 N.E.2d 716
(1972); People v. Brooks, 51 Ill. 2d 156, 281 N.E.2d 326 (1.72).
81. 49 Ill. 2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971).
82. Act of July 11, 1957, ch. 38 § 22-1 et. seq., [1957] Ill. Laws 2569
(repealed 1971).
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than in the Drug Abuse Control Act,8 3 was a constitutionally
invalid classification. 84 This classification was found to be arbitrary and therefore violative of both the Illinois and United
States Constitutions. 5 The thrust of the opinion was that, having set up a hard-soft drug dichotomy, the Illinois Legislature
could not arbitrarily assign a particular drug to one certain category.8 6 Because it was a classification that was under attack,
the court chose to utilize the "rationality test;" if any state of
affairs could reasonably be conceived which would justify the
classification, it would be upheld.8 7 The court proceeded "not
to determine scientific questions, but to judge whether the data
presently available provides [sic] a reasonable basis for the
described classification of marijuana."8 8
Upon consideration of the materials and data presented, the
court made certain observations and drew certain conclusions as
to the attributes of marijuana. While the issue was the inclusion
of marijuana in the Narcotic Drug Act, and the test applied was
the "rationality test," the court made virtual findings of fact as
to the characteristics of marijuana. One such finding was that
almost all authorities agree that marijuana is not a narcotic or
addictive in the sense which these terms are precisely used.89
By this the court meant that marijuana use does not involve
tolerance, physical dependence, or the withdrawal syndrome, and
the court so stated.9 0 The court further found that physical ill
83. Act of August 17, 1967, ch. 111%, § 801 et. seq., [1967] Ill. Laws
31.95 (repealed 1971).
84. 49 Ill. 2d at 350, 275 N.E.2d at 414; ci. People v. Elwell, 54 Mich.
App. 306, 220 N.W.2d 770 (1974). But see Sherman v. State, 89 Nev.
84, 506 P.2d 417 (1973); Gaskin v. State, 490 S.W.2d 521 (1973); Locke
v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. R. 49, 329 S.W.2d 873 (1959).
85. 49 Ill. 2d at 349, 350, 275 N.E.2d at 414. ILL CONsT. art. I, § 2
(1970); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
86. 49 i. 2d at 350, 275 N.E.2d at 414; see Comment, People v.
McCabe: Marijuana and Equal Protection, 66 Nw. U.L. Rav. 829, at
838 (1972).
87. 49 Ill. 2d at 340, 275 N.E.2d at 409.
88. Id. at 342, 275 N.E.2d at 409.
89. Id. at 345, 275 N.E.2d at 411. Accord, State v. Zorres, 78 Wash.
92, 475 P.2d 109 (1970); People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 115, 194 N.W.2d
878, 887 (1972). People v. Sinclair was a case substantially similar to

McCabe, the same type of statutory classification of marijuana with
"hard drugs" was attacked as being unconstitutional. In addition to the
conclusions drawn about marijuana which parallel those found in
McCabe, the court in Sinclair also found that marijuana does not lead
to chronic psychosis, and that long term use in moderate doses had no
harmful effects. 387 Mich. at 111, 112, 194 N.W.2d at 885, 886.
90. 49 Il.2d at 345, 275 N.E.2d at 413. Accord, In re Jones, 35 Cal.
App. 3d 531, 110 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1973) (J.Brown dissenting). This case
involved a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner asserting that
his sentence for a first offense of selling marijuana constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. In addition to conclusions similar to those in
McCabe, Justice Brown was persuaded that present evidence does not
establish a causal relationship between marijuana use and the antimotivational syndrome and that there is no evidence to suggest that marl-
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effects from marijuana use are, so far as is known, relatively
moderate, and that marijuana use does not lead to opiate (heroin) addiction or to aggressive or criminal behavior. 9 1
In McCabe the Illinois Supreme Court, having found no rational basis for the classification in issue, held that the inclusion
of marijuana in the Narcotic Drug Act was arbitrary and deprived the defendant of equal protection of the law.9 2 Recall
that in McCabe the court set out "not to determine scientific
questions, but to judge whether the data presently available provides [sic] a reasonable basis for the described classification of
marijuana."93 If the Illinois Supreme Court were to presently
pass on the question, not as an exercise in determining scientific
questions, would the court find that the data presently available
provide a reasonable basis for finding a compelling state interest in prohibiting the possession and ingestion of marijuana by
an individual in the privacy of his home?
CONCLUSION

The question is whether the Illinois Cannabis Control Act
violates a right to privacy guaranteed by either the Illinois or
United States Constitution. Inherent in the resolution of this
question are numerous other issues. It would appear to be well
settled law that when state action infringes upon a constitutional
or fundamental liberty, the state must show a compelling, and
not merely a legitimate or rational interest, to sustain such action. Is there such a right to privacy which encompasses the
right to use marijuana in the privacy of the home? May such
a federal right be discerned, through Griswold and its progeny,
emphasizing a zone of privacy about the home? Aside from such
a federal right, would not the language of the Illinois Constitution9 4 clearly guarantee a right to privacy and freedom from intrusion in the home?
Given such a right, is there truly a compelling state interest
in the prohibition of marijuana use in the privacy of the home?
With the observations made in McCabe, and with other data
presently available, is the Illinois Supreme Court about to conclude, as did the Alaska court in Ravin, that the use of marijuana
does not constitute a public health problem of any significant
juana use in humans affects fetal development. 35 Cal. App. 3d at 546,
547, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 775, 777.
91. 49 Ill. 2d at 345, 275 N.E.2d at 413. Accord, 35 Cal. App. 3d at
548, 549, 551, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 775-77; 387 Mich. at 111, 112, 194 N.W.2d
at 885.
92. 49 Ill. 2d at 351, 275 N.E.2d at 414.

93. See note 88 supra.
94. See note 78 supra.
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dimensions?95 And what of the state's interest (is it compelling?) in controlling activities of the individual which present no
harm to anyone except possibly those enjoying them? Is the authority of the state to control the individual limited to those activities of the individual which are related to the public's health,
safety, or general welfare and adversely affect others or the public at large? 96
As was stated earlier, until recently the right of the state
to proscribe marijuana use appeared to be virtually unchallengeable. The issue, it would seem, rather than being well settled,
now grows more viable. The opinion in Ravin is unquestionably
a first in this area of the law. It remains to be seen whether
in years to come it will prove exemplary of the mainstream of
judicial thought.
Jonathan Kuller

95. See note 69 supra.
96. See note 73 supra.

